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BE HONEST WITH ME: HOW FEDERAL 
REGULATION OF SPORTS GAMBLING MUST 
PROTECT THE INTEGRITY OF THE GAME 
Grant Ellfeldt* 
On May 14, 2018, the Supreme Court struck down the Professional and 
Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA).  Before the Court’s decision, 
PASPA had entirely prohibited states from legalizing sports gambling.  In 
light of their newfound liberty, states began to individually legalize and reg-
ulate sports gambling.  The federal government did not wait long to introduce 
their own regulations.  On December 19, 2018, Congress introduced the 
Sports Wagering Market Integrity Act (SWMIA).  At its core, SWMIA is 
designed to protect the integrity of professional sports. 
To protect the integrity of professional sports and prevent fraud, 
SWMIA must accomplish three things.  First, because sports wagers are sim-
ilar to securities, SWMIA’s regulations should mirror securities regulations.  
Specifically, the bill should establish a federal agency to enforce criminal 
punishments for fraud.  While SWMIA establishes the National Sports Wa-
gering Clearinghouse (“Clearinghouse”) to collect and distribute infor-
mation, Congress should extend the powers of the Clearinghouse to investi-
gate and enforce criminal punishments against fraud. 
Second, SWMIA must properly balance the roles of federal and state 
governments.  Through a form of cooperative federalism, SWMIA appropri-
ately balances state and federal roles.  SWMIA establishes the Clearinghouse 
to centralize resources in the fight against illegal gambling.  At the same 
time, by allowing states to individually license their operators, SWMIA pre-
serves local discretion in the states.  
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2020, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.  The author would like to thank 
Professor Carlos Berdejo for his insight and feedback.  The author would also like to thank the staff 
members and editors of Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review for their hard work in 
publishing the article.  He would specifically like to thank Rozalyn Johnson and Christopher Net-
niss for going above and beyond their duties to edit the article.  Finally, the author would like to 
thank his classmates Chaz Shizumura for talking sports every day and Amanda Lee for reminding 
him to not take life too seriously. 
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Finally, successful regulations must both encourage and require the 
professional sports leagues to cooperate with enforcement agencies.  To en-
courage cooperation, SWMIA grants exclusive control of sports gambling 
data to the leagues.  While the exclusive data provision grants the leagues 
immense power, it is necessary to encourage cooperation between the gov-
ernment and the leagues.  Merely encouraging the leagues to cooperate, how-
ever, is not enough.  SWMIA must also require the leagues to cooperate.  
Otherwise, as Tim Donaghy’s dramatic scandal illustrates, the leagues have 
leeway to conceal pervasive fraud. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On May 30, 2007, Tim Donaghy teed up a perfectly white golf ball, 
driver in hand.1  His phone vibrated inside his pocket.2  He straightened up 
and answered the phone.3  His driver fell to the soft grass that surrounded his 
beautiful Florida home.4  Two weeks later, Donaghy was sitting in the United 
States Attorney’s Office in Brooklyn, New York, divulging shocking infor-
mation about the largest sports gambling scandal in nearly a century.5 
Between 1994 and 2007, Tim Donaghy refereed National Basketball 
Association (NBA) games.6  There was nothing suspicious about Donaghy 
on the surface, but he had a serious detrimental habit.7  Donaghy was a com-
pulsive gambler.8  In 2003, he allegedly conspired with a small group of 
sports bookkeepers to place wagers on games that he officiated.9  The group 
 
1.  Scott Eden, How Former Ref Tim Donaghy Conspired to Fix NBA Games, ESPN (Feb. 
19, 2019), https://www.espn.com/nba/story/_/id/25980368/how-former-ref-tim-donaghy-con-
spired-fix-nba-games [https://perma.cc/2RMQ-GAAN].  
2. See id.  
3. See id.  
4. See id.  
5. Id.  
6. Id.  
7. Id.  
8. Id.  
9. Id. 
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started with small bets, but the stakes quickly escalated.10  Donaghy and his 
crew allegedly placed large bets on games he officiated, but not large enough 
to raise suspicion by the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI).11  By the 
time the FBI began its investigation, Donaghy had dug himself into one of 
the biggest scams in sports history.12 
During their investigation, the FBI met with high-level NBA execu-
tives, including then-Commissioner David Stern.13  Stern promised to fully 
comply with the investigation.14 However, just a few days after the meeting, 
the story leaked to the press, blowing the investigation wide open.15  As a 
result, any chance of catching other referees entangled in the scandal dissi-
pated once the story hit the press.16  Although Donaghy was punished, the 
FBI missed out on a golden opportunity to uncover the depth of this gam-
bling scandal.17 
Donaghy’s scandal embodies the gambling fraud that threatens the in-
tegrity of professional sports.  For this very reason, the major professional 
sports leagues have historically opposed sports gambling.18  This intense op-
position, however, has evolved into mild skepticism and has now bloomed 
into open acceptance.19  In the past few years, the leagues, including the 
NBA, National Football League (NFL), National Hockey League (NHL), 
and Major League Baseball (MLB) have more or less come to approve the 
legalization of sports gambling.20 
 
10. Id.  
11. Id.  
12. Id.  
13. Id.  
14. Id.  
15. Id.  
16. Id.  
17. Id.  
18. Robert Shawhan, Legalizing Federal Sports Gambling Laws: You Got to Know When 
to Hold’em, 40 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 41, 44–45 (2018).  
19. Id.  
20. See David Purdum, $12 Billion in Handle? Why Pennsylvania Sports Betting Could be 
Huge, ESPN (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/25278065/with-estimated-
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Until May 14, 2018, federal law prohibited sports gambling in every 
state with limited exceptions.21  When the Supreme Court struck down the 
law prohibiting sports gambling in Murphy v. NCAA, states became free to 
legalize and regulate sports gambling.22  Not surprisingly, Congress did not 
wait long before drafting regulations designed to maintain competitive in-
tegrity and combat fraudulent gambling.23  The federal regulations are cur-
rently pending before the House of Representatives.24 
To be successful, federal regulation of sports gambling must protect the 
integrity of professional sports.  Using the regulations pending before the 
House as a guideline, successful federal regulations will accomplish three 
things.  First, since securities and sports gambling regulations are so similar, 
sports gambling regulations should emulate securities regulations.  Second, 
appropriate regulations will maintain a balance between federal and state 
power.  Finally, successful regulations should encourage and require the 
leagues to cooperate with government enforcement agencies.  Donaghy’s 
scandal emphasizes why the regulations must keep the leagues accountable 
for internal violations, and how the current draft alarmingly falls a step short.   
This Article first argues that sports wagers are very similar to securities 
regulations.  Because they are similar, federal regulations of sports gambling 
should largely draw from securities regulations.  Next, this Article estab-
lishes the importance of balancing federal and state power when regulating 
sports gambling, and explains how the Sports Wagering Market Integrity Act 
(SWMIA) properly balances such power.  Finally, this Article argues that to 
 
12-million-handle-here-why-pennsylvania-sports-betting-market-dwarf-nevada 
[https://perma.cc/Q8MN-SPTA]; see also Anthony Cabot & Keith Miller, Regulatory Models for 
Sports Wagering: The Debate Between State vs. Federal Oversight, 8 UNLV GAMING L.J. 153, 
177-78 (2018) (explaining how decline in NFL ratings has led first to the proliferation of fantasy 
sports and sports gambling); see also Adam Candee, NHL’s Bettman Joins NBA, NFL In Call For 
National Sports Betting Rules, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (May 29, 2018, 11:25 AM), https://www.le-
galsportsreport.com/20787/nhl-joins-nba-nfl-in-national-sports-betting-rules/ 
[https://perma.cc/6KKT-PNS8] [hereinafter NHL’s Bettman Joins NBA & NFL]; see also David 
Purdum, MLB to Talk Betting with Owners, ESPN (Feb. 5, 2015), 
https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/12286521/mlb-commissioner-rob-manfred-says-legalized-
sports-betting-needs-fresh-consideration [https://perma.cc/R276-5FWY] [hereinafter MLB Talk 
with Owners].  
21. 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3704 (2012).  
22. Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).  
23. Sports Wagering Market and Integrity Act, S. 3793, 115th Cong. (2018).  
24. Id. 
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protect the integrity of professional sports, federal regulations should both 
encourage and require the leagues to cooperate with enforcement agencies.  
To foster cooperation, SWMIA vests exclusive data rights in the sports 
leagues.  However, SWMIA falls one step short and must also require the 
leagues to cooperate.   
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Sports Gambling in American History 
Traditionally, American culture has given sports gambling a cold re-
ception.25  The widely-publicized integrity violations in historical American 
sports have made sports gambling far from a fan favorite.26  For example, the 
1919 Chicago White Sox essentially threw away the World Series after be-
coming involved with gambling operators.27  Pete Rose, baseball’s all-time 
leader in hits, still faces exclusion from the Hall of Fame because he placed 
wagers on his team as a manager.28  Tim Donaghy has similarly become a 
social outcast because he allegedly placed wagers on NBA games that he 
refereed.29 
Despite these incidents, sports gambling has remained legal in a few 
states, including Nevada.30  Over the last forty years, Congress has indirectly 
regulated sports gambling by helping individual states impose local regula-
tions.31 However, congressional regulation of sports betting has been limited 
in scope.  For example, in 1961, Congress enacted the Wire Act.32  This Act 
 
25. See Shawhan, supra note 18, at 44–45.  
26. Id. at 45.  
27. MLB Talk with Owners, supra note 20.  
28. Pete Rose Banned for Life: Giamatti Says He Bet On Games; Appeal Possible in Year, 
L.A. TIMES (Aug. 24, 1989, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1989-08-24-
mn-1531-story.html [https://perma.cc/9LRY-QJ9B].  
29. Eden, supra note 1.  
30. Shawhan, supra note 18, at 44.  
31. E.g. Cabot & Miller, supra note 20, at 154.  
32. 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2012).  
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criminalized certain wire transfers pertaining to gambling.33  In 1978, Con-
gress enacted the Interstate Horseracing Act (IHA).34  The IHA ensured that 
bookkeepers split profits with track and horse owners.35  While the IHA reg-
ulated profits of private operators, it did not regulate profits on a criminal 
level.36  The Wire Act and IHA represent the bulk of federal regulation of 
sports gambling in the latter twentieth century.37 
B. PASPA: Broad Prohibition on Sports Gambling 
In 1992, Congress passed the Professional and Amateur Sports Protec-
tion Act (PASPA).38  Instead of regulating sports gambling, PASPA only 
prohibited state legislatures from legalizing sports gambling.39  PASPA did 
not allow states or persons to “sponsor, operate, advertise, or promote . . . a 
lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or wagering scheme” based 
on professional or amateur sports.40  However, PASPA carved out several 
exceptions, including grandfathering Nevada outside the prohibition.41  The 
Act also provided a limited exception for New Jersey, which allowed the 
state to legalize and license sports gambling in Atlantic City within one year 
of PASPA’s enactment.42 
Throughout the PASPA era, the professional sports leagues have col-
lectively supported PASPA’s purpose and resisted the legalization of sports 
 
33. Id.  
34. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3001–3007 (2012).  
35. See id.  
36. See Cabot & Miller, supra note 20, at 155.  
37. Id. at 154–55.  
38. 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3704 (2012).  
39. Id. § 3702.  
40. Id.  
41. Id. § 3704(a)(2).  
42. Id. § 3704(a)(3); New Jersey never legalized sports gambling in their allotted year, but 
they tried hard in later years.  See Scott J. Gregory, Don’t Bet on It? Economic and Legal Implica-
tions of Legalized Sports Betting and Daily Fantasy Sports in the United States, 10 OHIO ST. BUS. 
L.J. 217, 222–27 (2016).  
ELLFELDT (DO NOT DELETE) 12/4/19  11:09 AM 
2019] BE HONEST WITH ME 95 
gambling.43  While the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s (NCAA) 
position has not changed, the NBA, NFL, NHL, and MLB have slowly 
shifted from opposing sports gambling to approving of it, starting with fan-
tasy sports.44 
C. Fantasy Sports and the Slow Crawl Towards Approval of Sports 
Gambling 
Fantasy sports function similar to sports gambling.45  Instead of betting 
on the outcome of individual games, fantasy participants essentially bet on 
the outcome of individual players.46  Participants typically pay an entry fee 
to join a fantasy league.47  The participants then assemble their team of indi-
vidual players, usually from a draft pool.48  Each week, the professional play-
ers receive points based on their individual performance.49  At the end of the 
season, the participant with the most collective points or team victories wins 
and receives a prize.50  By choosing players who they believe will perform 
well, participants place a bet on the collective performances of real-life play-
ers.51 
 
43. See Gregory, supra note 42, at 220 (detailing the bitter battle over legalization of sports 
betting between New Jersey’s legislature and the major professional and collegiate sport leagues).  
44. See id. at 235–37. 
45. See Marc Edelman, Navigating the Legal Risks of Daily Fantasy Sports: A Detailed 
Primer in Federal and State Gambling Law, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 117, 129–34 (2016) (outlining 
how daily fantasy sports must comply with gambling laws because of their similarities).  
46. See How Online Fantasy Sports Work, BETTING USA, https://www.bettin-
gusa.com/fantasy/how-it-works/ [https://perma.cc/2UU7-B88P]; see also Edelman, supra note 45, 
at 129–34; see also Andrew Brandt, The NFL has a Gambling Problem, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED 
(Nov. 5, 2015), https://www.si.com/mmqb/2015/11/05/nfl-gambling-daily-fantasy-dfs-draftkings-
fanduel-goodell [https://perma.cc/98U9-4FJN].  
47. How Online Fantasy Sports Work, supra note 46. 
48. See id.  
49. Id.  
50. Id.  
51. See Edelman, supra note 45, at 129–34; see also Brandt, supra note 46.  
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Fantasy sports have paved the way for the legalization of sports gam-
bling.52  In the last decade, both the NBA and NFL reached substantial spon-
sorship deals with major fantasy companies like FanDuel and DrafKings.53  
The NBA has even taken an equity stake in FanDuel.54  The change in posi-
tion by the sports leagues is largely motivated by the need to restore fan en-
gagement.55  For example, ratings for NBA and NFL games—the two most 
popular sports in the United States—has declined in recent years.56  As a 
result of the decline, the leagues are looking for new ways to restore fan 
engagement.57  Fantasy sports keep fans engaged in ways that traditional 
sports do not.58  For example, even when the outcome of a game is largely 
determined by the score, fantasy participants will continue watching to see 
how their player performs.59  The increasing popularity of fantasy sports has 
played a large role in the acceptance of sports gambling. 
D. The Long Battle Between New Jersey and the Leagues 
As fantasy sports paved the way for sports gambling, New Jersey set 
out to re-vamp its gambling economy.60  During World War II, long before 
the passage of PASPA, the gambling economy in New Jersey’s Atlantic City 
 
52. See Edelman, supra note 45, at 129.  
53. Dustin Gouker, DFS Partnership / Sponsorship Tracker, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Nov. 
13, 2018), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/dfs-sponsorship-tracker/ [https://perma.cc/6TP3-
882T].  
54. Darren Heitner, FanDuel Signs Multi-Year Partnerships With 13 NBA Teams, FORBES 
(June 23, 2015, 8:54 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/darrenheitner/2015/06/23/fanduel-signs-
multi-year-partnerships-with-13-nba-teams/#6653277bbf25 [https://perma.cc/ML6B-Q7Q6]. 
55. See Cabot & Miller, supra note 20, at 161-62.  
56. Scooby Axson, NFL TV Ratings Down 7.5 Percent, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 18, 
2017), https://www.si.com/nfl/2017/10/18/nfl-television-ratings-decline [https://perma.cc/U9K8-
2WUW]; see Cabot & Miller, supra note 20, at 161–62.  
57. Cabot & Miller, supra note 20, at 162.  
58. Id.  
59. Id.  
60. Gregory, supra note 42, at 223.  
ELLFELDT (DO NOT DELETE) 12/4/19  11:09 AM 
2019] BE HONEST WITH ME 97 
slumped.61  After a legislative push that increased tourism by stimulating 
casino markets, the city’s economy steadily grew.62  Despite this past growth, 
in recent years, Atlantic City’s gambling economy has reached yet another 
slump.63  In 2014, four casinos shut down completely.64  In order to revitalize 
its gambling industry, Atlantic City needed to differentiate its gambling ex-
perience.  By the time New Jersey committed itself to revitalizing its casinos, 
PASPA obstructed the state’s policy.65  Although PASPA allowed New Jer-
sey to legalize sports gambling in Atlantic City within one year of PASPA’s 
enactment,66  New Jersey did not legalize sports gambling within their allot-
ted year.67   
In 2011, by referendum, New Jersey voters repealed the state ban on 
sports gambling.68  After the voters repealed the ban, the New Jersey legis-
lature quickly enacted a law authorizing and regulating sports gambling at 
casinos and racetracks.69  New Jersey realized that their law conflicted with 
PASPA, so they made efforts to reconcile the conflict.70  For example, a New 
Jersey Congressman proposed a federal bill that would exempt New Jersey 
from PASPA.71  They also proposed a bill that would give all states four 
 
61. Id.  
62. Id. at 224.  
63. Id. at 225.  
64. Wayne Parry, Associated Press, As 4 of its 12 Casinos Closed, Atlantic City Casino 
Industry Grew Operating Profit 44 Percent, FOX BUSINESS (Apr. 7, 2015), https://www.foxbusi-
ness.com/markets/as-4-of-its-12-casinos-closed-atlantic-city-casino-industry-grew-operating-
profit-44-percent [https://perma.cc/PXE6-2MVU].  
65. Gregory, supra note 42, at 227.  
66. 28 U.S.C. § 3704(a)(3) (2012).  
67. Gregory, supra note 42, at 222.  
68. NJ Voters: We Want to Bet on Sports if US Says Yes, NBC (Nov. 8, 2011, 10:44 PM), 
https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/NJ-Sports-Betting-Votes-Yes-Federal-Ban-Lifted-
133506083.html [https://perma.cc/X36U-2KCG].  
69. NCAA v. Christie, 61 F. Supp. 3d 488, 491 (D. N.J. 2014).  
70. Gregory, supra note 42, at 226–27. 
71. N.J. Betting and Equal Treatment Act of 2012, H.R. 3809, 112th Cong. (2012).  
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years to legalize sports gambling.72  Neither of the bills, however, survived 
House committee debates.73 
In 2012, the same year that New Jersey amended their Constitution to 
allow sports gambling, the four major sports leagues and the NCAA brought 
an action in federal court to enjoin the amendment.74  The leagues argued 
that the amendment clearly violated PASPA.75  In response, New Jersey 
argued that PASPA violated the Tenth Amendment because it 
commandeered state authority.76  However, the Third Circuit Court held that 
PASPA did not violate the Tenth Amendment.77  The court framed the issue 
in terms of federal power and state power under the Supremacy Clause.78  In 
terms of the anti-commandeering principle, the court distinguished between 
requiring and prohibiting the states from doing something.79  It reasoned, 
“[w]hen Congress passes a law that operates via the Supremacy Clause to 
invalidate contrary state laws, it is not telling the states what to do; it is 
barring them from doing something they want to do.”80  Unlike prior cases 
of federal coercion, the court continued, “PASPA does not require or coerce 
the states to lift a finger.”81  Based on this distinction, the court held that 
PASPA did not violate the Tenth Amendment and thus, PASPA prevented 
New Jersey from repealing its ban and legalizing sports gambling.82  The 
 
72. Sports Gaming Opportunity Act of 2012, H.R. 3797, 112th Cong. (2012).  
73. See id. (did not pass House of Representatives); see also H.R. 3809 (did not pass House 
of Representatives).  
74. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208, 217 (3d Cir. 2013).  
75. Id.  
76. Id. at 224.  
77. Id. at 237.  
78. Id. at 230.  
79. Id.  
80. Id.  
81. Id. at 231 (emphasis in original).  
82. Id. at 237.  
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court’s decision received due criticism.83  Experts and scholars alike took 
issue with the amount of unregulated, illegal sports gambling that occurred 
daily and they criticized the court’s apparent willingness to overlook the 
unregulated market.84  Although the Supreme Court denied New Jersey’s 
writ of certiorari,85 New Jersey’s persistence and legal arguments would soon 
win the day. 
E. Prohibited No More: New Jersey Finally Wins and Changes the 
Landscape of Sports Gambling 
After the Third Circuit upheld PASPA in 2013, New Jersey enacted a 
subsequent law specifically drafted to circumvent PASPA.86  The legislature 
specifically framed the law as a repeal rather than an authorization of sports 
gambling.87  As expected, the leagues once again brought suit to invalidate 
the law.88  Consistent with the Third Circuit’s ruling in 2013, the District 
Court and Third Circuit found that PASPA did not violate the anti-comman-
deering rule because it “does not command states to take affirmative ac-
tions.”89 
However, unlike the 2013 case, the Supreme Court granted certiorari 
in Murphy v. NCAA.90  The issue of the case boiled down to whether repeal-
ing a law that prohibits sports gambling is equivalent to “authorizing” sports 
gambling.91  In its decision, the Court explained the history of the anti-com-
mandeering principle, starting with the ratification of the Constitution.92  The 
 
83. See Gregory, supra note 42, at 235–40.  
84. See id.  
85. Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1472 (2018).  
86. Id.  
87. Id.  
88. Id.  
89. Id. at 1473 (citing Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208, 
401 (3d Cir. 2013)).  
90. Id.  
91. Id. at 1473–75.  
92. Id. at 1475.  
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Court emphasized that the anti-commandeering principle “is important” be-
cause it is a “structural protection[] of liberty,” it “promotes political ac-
countability,” and it “prevents Congress from shifting the cost of regulations 
to the states.”93  After setting the stage of precedent and policy, the Supreme 
Court held that PASPA violated the anti-commandeering rule because it “un-
equivocally dictates what a state legislature may and may not do.”94  Regard-
less of the interpretation of “authorize,” the Court found that through 
PASPA, “state legislatures are put under the direct control of Congress.”95 
When considering the anti-commandeering principle, the Supreme 
Court rejected the distinction between prohibiting and requiring the states to 
act.96  According to the Court, the basic anti-commandeering rule boils down 
to: “Congress cannot issue direct orders to state legislatures.”97  As far as the 
Court was concerned, this basic rule applies regardless if the law prohibits 
or requires the states to act.98  The Court also affirmatively refused to frame 
the issue in terms of federal supremacy.99  It held that the Supremacy Clause 
does not confer independent legislative power.100  Rather, it is simply a “rule 
of decision” when deciding conflicts between federal and state law.101  Since 
the Constitution grants the federal government power to regulate private ac-
tors, the Supremacy Clause is essentially a tiebreaking mechanism between 
federal and state regulations.102  PASPA’s provision preventing states from 
 
93. Id. at 1477.  
94. Id. at 1478.  
95. Id.  
96. Id.  
97. Id.  
98. Id.  
99. Id. at 1479.  
100. Id. (citations omitted).  
101. Id. (citations omitted). 
102. Id.  
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legalizing sports gambling, however, did not regulate or restrict private ac-
tors.103  Therefore, PASPA could not be classified as a federal regulation and 
the Supremacy Clause did not apply.104  After New Jersey’s long and bitter 
fight, the Supreme Court finally struck down PASPA.105 
F. Enter Federal Government: Schumer and Hatch Draft Federal 
Regulations of Sports Gambling 
Many states did not wait long after Murphy struck down PASPA to 
legalize and regulate sports gambling.  Since Murphy, eleven states, includ-
ing New Jersey, have proposed and passed legislation legalizing sports gam-
bling.106  New Jersey collected $94 million in sports gambling revenue in the 
second half of 2018, but this number is relatively small compared to the 
$2.51 billion in racetrack and casino revenue.107  More states are expected to 
pass similar legislation as they take advantage of tax benefits and explore 
new methods to revitalize local economies.108 
 
103. Id. at 1481.  
104. Id.  
105. Id. at 1485.  
106. Alexandra Licata, 42 States Have or are Moving Towards Legalizing Sports Betting – 
Here are the States Where Sports Betting is Legal, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 2, 2019, 1:51 PM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/states-where-sports-betting-legal-usa-2019-7 
[https://perma.cc/U73A-ALHK].  
107. Joyce Hanson, NJ Sees $1.25B Wagered in Legal Sports Betting in 2018, LAW 360 
(Jan. 15, 2019, 6:58 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1118464/nj-sees-1-25b-wagered-in-le-
gal-sports-betting-in-2018 (last visited Oct. 23, 2019).  
108. Illegal influence of sports matches is a substantial part of the illegal gambling market. 
Illegal influence usually consists of a group of operators and high-stake gamblers working with 
corrupt professional sports insiders who unduly influence the outcome of games under their control. 
This Note is most concerned with this kind of illegal influence, but there are many forms of illegal 
gambling. Money laundering is also an illegal practice closely related to sports gambling. See Best 
Practices for Anti-Money Laundering Compliance, AM. GAMING ASS’N (2017), https://www.amer-
icangaming.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Best-Practice-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/WWF7-
72GL].  
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Predictably, the federal government quickly got involved.  In Decem-
ber 2018, senators Chuck Schumer and Orrin Hatch proposed the Sports Wa-
gering Market Integrity Act (SWMIA).109  SWMIA establishes comprehen-
sive federal regulations of sports gambling.110  The Act primarily “set[s] 
standards for sports wagering and provide[s] law enforcement with addi-
tional authority to target the illegal sports wagering market.”111  The Bill will 
likely not pass in 2019, but it may pass eventually.112  The bipartisan nature 
of SWMIA and the strong support from professional sports leagues113 sug-
gests that the Act ultimately has a strong chance of passing. 
III. DISCUSSION 
The successful regulation of sports gambling is a daunting task.  To 
successfully regulate sports gambling, maintaining the integrity of profes-
sional sports is crucial.  There are many ways to approach the integrity issues 
that lie outside the scope of this Article, but successful regulations should 
focus on three things.  First, because of their inherent similarities, sports 
gambling regulations should mirror securities regulations.  Specifically, the 
regulations should develop an enforcement agency that imposes criminal 
punishments for fraud.  SWMIA establishes a national agency to help com-
bat illegal gambling, but this agency lacks the ability to criminally enforce 
fraudulent activities. 
Second, sports gambling regulations must strike a proper balance be-
tween federal and state control.  The states have a significant local interest 
in licensing operators within their borders.  At the same time, the federal 
government has a significant national interest in combatting illegal gam-
 
109. See generally Sports Wagering Market and Integrity Act, S. 3793, 115th Cong. (2018).  
110. See generally id.  
111. Id. § 2(10) (Findings).  
112. Adam Candee, Hatch, Schumer Preparing to Drop Federal Sports Betting Bill in Sen-
ate, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Dec. 19, 2018, 9:51 AM), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/26901/fed-
eral-sports-betting-bill-drop/ [https://perma.cc/PZ65-QTP6] [hereinafter Sports Bill in Senate].  
113. In contrast to the NBA, NFL, MLB and NHL, the NCAA continues to strongly oppose 
the legalization of sports gambling.  See Candee, supra note 20; see also Dustin Gouker, NCAA 
Head: Sports Betting Is ‘Going to Threaten the Integrity of College Sports In Many Ways’, LEGAL 
SPORTS REP. (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/28038/ncaa-says-sports-betting-
will-threaten-integrity/ [https://perma.cc/N4EZ-DTNC].  
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bling.  SWMIA effectively balances both interests.  By adopting a coopera-
tive federalism approach, SWMIA leaves states with discretion in choosing 
who they license with.  Likewise, the Act establishes a national entity to col-
lect and distribute data to enforcement agencies.  SWMIA’s successful bal-
ancing of both federal and state interests will contribute to the success of the 
regulations. 
Finally, successful regulations must both encourage and require sports 
leagues to cooperate with one another.  The federal government cannot ef-
fectively combat fraud without their support.  To foster encouragement, the 
regulations should compensate the leagues for use of their data.  While com-
pensation for use of sports data is not supported in existing law, SWMIA 
creates an exception by granting the leagues exclusive control over data used 
by sports gamblers.  This data provision grants immense power to the 
leagues, but it is necessary to encourage cooperation between the leagues 
and government.  Donaghy’s scandal, however, illustrates how the leagues 
still might undermine enforcement agencies to preserve their brand.  The 
regulations, therefore, must also require the leagues to cooperate with en-
forcement agencies. 
A. Successful Sports Gambling Regulations Should Emulate Federal 
Securities Regulations 
“[T]here is no moral difference between gambling . . . on the race track 
and gambling in the stock market.”114  In his quote before Congress, Theo-
dore Roosevelt wryly articulates that gambling and investing share many 
similarities.  The Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934 regulate the registration 
and exchange of securities between investors.115  Mr. Roosevelt’s opinion 
suggests that because of their similarities, federal sports gambling regula-
tions should emulate security regulations for two reasons.  First, investment 
contracts and sports wagers are substantively similar.  Second, trading secu-
rities is also similar to placing sports wagers.  With these similarities in mind, 
Congress should craft sports gambling regulations that criminally punish for 
and broadly enforce against sports gambling fraud. 
  
 
114. 42 CONG. REC. 1346–50 (1908); John Maynard Keynes echoed Roosevelt’s senti-
ment: “It is usually agreed that casinos should, in the public interest, be inaccessible and expensive. 
And perhaps the same is true of Stock Exchanges.”  JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL 
THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY 159 (1936).  
115. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–78lll (2019).  
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1. Federal Sports Gambling Regulations Should Emulate Security 
Regulations Because Investment Contracts Are Similar to Sports 
Gambling Wagers 
Investment contracts and gambling wagers are similar for four reasons.  
First, investment contracts and sports wagers both involve payment, risk, and 
reward.  Second, the Supreme Court’s three-part test delineated in SEC v. 
W.J. Howey Co.,116 for determining what constitutes an investment contract 
extends to many sports wagers.  Third, many specific types of security in-
vestments are functionally similar to sports gambling wagers.  Finally, the 
entertainment value in sports gambling does not detract from its similarity to 
investment contracts. 
a. Investment Contracts and Sports Wagers Both Involve Payment, 
Risk, and Reward 
Investment contracts and sports wagers both involve payment, risk, and 
reward.  Common law defines gambling as the payment of “consideration in 
order to participate in an activity, that’s [sic] outcome is determined partly 
by chance, and may reward the participant with something of value.”117  Like 
gambling, investing in stock requires payment to participate.118  The outcome 
of the investment is at least partly determined by chance and involves reward 
of “something of value.”119  Investing in futures and corporate bonds, for 
example, “involve assuming a risk in hopes of an accession to wealth.”120 
 
116. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946).  
117. Christopher B. Chuff, “Rolling the Dice” on Financial Regulatory Reform: Gambling 
Law as a Framework for Regulating Structured Investments, 18 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 569, 
598 (2011) (citations omitted).  
118. Id.  
119. Id.  
120. Id.  
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b. The Howey Test for Securities Includes Many Sports Wagers 
Second, the legal test for defining an “investment contract” will include 
many sports wagers.  Under the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934, the defi-
nition of “security” includes “investment contracts.”121  In turn, the definition 
of “investment contract” has been judicially constructed to include three cri-
teria: (1) an investment of money, (2) in a common enterprise, and (3) with 
the expectation of profits to be derived solely from the efforts of the promoter 
or a third party.122  Regarding the first requirement, both sports gambling and 
securities require an investment of money.  Just as the security investor puts 
down money in hopes of a future return in a company’s performance, a sports 
gambler puts down money in hopes of a future return in a team’s perfor-
mance.   
For the second requirement, both practices involve a common enter-
prise.  Different circuit courts have applied two different standards of “com-
mon enterprise.”123  The first is horizontal commonality, which “involves the 
pooling of assets from multiple investors so that all share in the profits and 
risks of the enterprise.’”124  The second is vertical commonality, which re-
quires that “the investors’ fortunes be interwoven with and dependent upon 
the efforts and success of those seeking the investment or of third parties.”125  
Sports gambling is very similar to vertical commonality.  Just as investment 
contracts depend on “promoters” and “third parties,”126 sports wagers depend 
on promoters and third parties.  Sports gamblers rely on sportsbooks to pro-
mote sports gambling by accepting and paying out bets.  Additionally, sports 
gamblers rely on third-party teams and players to achieve the result that the 
gambler wagers for.  In fact, the results of the wager lie entirely in the hands 
of the third-party sports teams. 
 
121. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2019); SEC v. SG Ltd., 265 F.3d 42, 46 (1st Cir. 2001).  
122. SEC, 265 F.3d at 46.  
123. Id. at 49. 
124. Id.  
125. Id. (citation omitted).  
126. See id. (citations omitted).  
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For the third Howey requirement, both an investor and a sports gambler 
expect profits from their venture.127  Investors hope their recipient company 
will perform as the investor anticipates.  Similarly, gamblers hope their cho-
sen team will perform as the gambler anticipates.  Sports gambling arguably 
involves less of an expectation of profit than investment because the risks 
attached to sports gambling are higher.128  However, investors looking for 
high returns similarly make high-risk security investments.129  The fact that 
a sports wager is high-risk does not obviate the fact that the gambler expects 
profit.130  If sports gamblers truly did not expect a profit, they would not 
place wagers, and sports gambling would not exist.  Therefore, because many 
sports wagers meet the Howey definition of an “investment contract,” sports 
wagers and investment contracts are very similar. 
c. Many Specific Types of Investment Contracts Are Similar to 
Sports Wagers 
Securities are also similar to sports wagers because many specific types 
of security investments are similar to sports wagers.  For example, a deriva-
tive contract is essentially the same as a sports wager.131  A derivative is “a 
trading instrument whose value depends on the performance of another var-
iable.”132  Investors usually use derivatives to “hedge against” or “speculate 
on” price fluctuations in the market.133  For a long time, derivatives have 
been criticized as a “form of legalized gambling.”134  A district court in New 
York once found that a certain derivative contract was essentially a gamble, 
 
127. See id. at 46.  
128. See Thomas L. Hazen, Disparate Regulatory Schemes for Parallel Activities: Securi-
ties Regulation, Derivatives Regulation, Gambling, and Insurance, 24 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. 
L. 375, 409–10 (2005).  
129. Id.  
130. Id.  
131. Id. at 395.  
132. Kimberly D. Krawiec, More Than Just “New Financial Bingo”: A Risk-Based Ap-
proach to Understanding Derivatives, 23 J. CORP. L. 1, 7 (1997).  
133. Id.  
134. Hazen, supra note 128, at 395.  
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but nevertheless characterized it as a security.135  The court wrote: “Although 
I have characterized . . . [the] swap agreements as ‘bets’ and ‘speculations’ 
on currency fluctuations, the transactions were in the form of forward con-
tracts, swaps and derivatives.”136  Derivatives usually involve high risk and 
therefore are similar to sports wagers.137 
Futures contracts are also similar to sports wagers.  A futures contract 
involves exchanging money for a “delivery obligation” at a certain date in 
the future.138  “Most futures contracts, are functionally the same as a wager, 
since rather than delivering under the contract, the vast majority of futures 
contracts are settled through a process known as offset.”139  Generally, in-
stead of “transferring the underlying commodity or security, the parties enter 
into offsetting transactions.”140  Therefore, because the parties usually offset 
rather than deliver under the contract, the parties essentially place a wager 
on the future price of a good. 
Finally, hedging closely resembles a sports wager.  A hedge fund is 
“any pooled investment vehicle that is privately organized, administered by 
professional investment managers, and not widely available to the public.”141  
They are typically used to take “both long and short positions on debt and 
equity securities to reduce risk.”142  Like hedging, sports wagering can be 
 
135. Korea Life Ins. Co. v. Morgan Guar. Tr. Co. of N.Y., 269 F. Supp. 2d 424, 442 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).  
136. Id.  
137. Krawiec, supra note 132, at 7 (“[D]erivatives are generally perceived as very risky 
products.”).  
138. Hazen, supra note 128, at 406–07.  
139. Id. at 407.  
140. Id.  
141. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 875 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).  
142. Id. at 876.  
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used to minimize risk.  For example, a team owner can offset losses attribut-
able to low attendance in two ways.143  The owner could hedge for low at-
tendance on the stock market.144  Alternatively, the owner could make a bet 
against his or her own team as a functional hedge against revenue loss.145  
Both actions are protective measures in anticipation of revenue loss, yet tra-
ditional hedging is legal while gambling on one’s own team is not.146  To be 
clear, this Article does not advocate that owners should be allowed to bet on 
their own teams.  There are a host of moral issues associated with this kind 
of gambling.147  Nevertheless, hedging and gambling are functionally simi-
lar.  This similarity should encourage Congress to mirror sports gambling 
regulations on securities regulations. 
d. Entertainment Value in Sports Gambling Does Not Make It Less 
Like a Security 
Finally, the entertainment value in sports gambling does not detract 
from its similarity to an investment contract.  Sports gambling has inherent 
entertainment value.148  Most consumers who occasionally place bets would 
classify sports wagering as recreational rather than professional.149  The en-
tertainment value of a sports wager, however, does not make it less similar 
to an investment contract.  Courts have found that a stock exchange struc-
tured like a virtual video game was still an investment contract for purposes 
of securities laws.150  The court carefully distinguished between substance 
and nomenclature.151  When addressing the entertainment element of the ex-
change, the court gave little weight to the fact that the exchange was called 
 
143. Hazen, supra note 128, at 434–35.  
144. Id. at 435.  
145. Id.  
146. Id. at 377–78.  
147. E.g., id. at 379 (hedging against terrorist attacks creates moral issues).  
148. Id. at 409 n.147.  
149. Id.  
150. SEC v. SG Ltd., 265 F.3d 42, 48 (1st Cir. 2001).  
151. See id. at 47–48.  
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and structured like a game.152  The court explained that “it is equally imma-
terial whether the promoter depicts the enterprise as a serious commercial 
venture or dubs it a game.”153  Therefore, though labeled as “games,” sports 
wagers are still substantively similar to investment contracts. 
Furthermore, like sports gambling, investing in securities often in-
volves some form of entertainment or “thrill.”154  As one scholar has noted: 
[I]nvesting in individual securities or derivative products provides 
a form of entertainment for some investors in much the same way 
as rational actors are willing to gamble, notwithstanding the odds 
and the cut to the house, because of the enjoyment of the game.155 
Both investing and gambling even satisfy the “need to play because of 
the excitement, risk, and rewards investing and gambling both provide.”156  
Therefore, labeling should not distract Congress from the substance of the 
transactions.  Indeed, sports wagers and investment contracts are similar for 
many reasons.  They both involve the core elements of payment, risk, and 
reward.  Many sports wagers would furthermore qualify as investment con-
tracts under Howey’s established test, and many particular types of invest-
ment contracts closely resemble sports wagers.  For each reason described, 
and because both investment contracts and securities have some entertain-
ment value, the regulation of sports gambling should resemble the regulation 
of securities. 
2. Federal Sports Gambling Regulations Should Emulate Security 
Regulations Because Trading Securities is Similar to Making a 
Sports Wager 
In addition to substantive similarities, the economics and behavior in-
volved in trading securities are similar to placing sports wagers.  First, trad-
ing a security is economically similar to placing a sports wager because both 
 
152. Id. at 52–53.  
153. Id. at 48.  
154. Hazen, supra note 128, at 401.  
155. Chuff, supra note 117, at 607.  
156. Id. at 601–02.  
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are intended to “reap economic benefits” and both involve “risk taking.”157  
In fact, “[m]any gambling activities involve the same kind of analytical abil-
ity, research, and skill that informed investing requires.”158  For example, 
analyzing how many games the Los Angeles Rams will win in a season re-
quires extensive research of player statistics, matchups, prior records, power 
indexes, and many other factors.159  The bettor then analyzes the data and 
forms logical predictions about how many wins the Rams will acquire next 
season.160  Much of the same “research” and “analytical ability” is required 
in investing.161 
Additionally, sports gamblers and investors share many behavioral 
similarities.  First, both practices include overconfidence bias.162  Gamblers 
often approach their wager with a false sense of confidence, and they often 
attribute their losses to being “unlucky.”163  Similarly, investors “are reluc-
tant to believe that the[] risks apply to them personally.”164  Both gamblers 
and investors often approach the wager or investment with a false sense of 
confidence that impairs their judgment. 
Sports gamblers and investors also exhibit confirmation bias.165  When 
they collect information, both gamblers and investors “seek out information 
that confirms their beliefs about uncertainties” and “discard information con-
trary to their beliefs.”166  Both also tend to believe that their information and 
 
157. Hazen, supra note 128, at 377.  
158. Chuff, supra note 117, at 599–600.  
159. Id.  
160. Id.  
161. Id.  
162. Id. at 609.  
163. Id.  
164. Id.  
165. Id. at 610.  
166. Id.  
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analytical ability are better than that of the general public, and thus are more 
likely to commit to information that supports their initial position.167 
Although they generally believe their analytical ability is above-aver-
age, sports gamblers and investors also tend to participate in herd behav-
ior.168  In other words, when trading securities or placing wagers, both parties 
have a “tendency to invest or bet with the crowd or herd.”169  Sports gamblers 
often track the ways the sportsbooks adjust the lines, and they have a “fear 
of acting contrary to the majority” based on the belief that the majority 
knows something important.170  Similarly, investors track the way stock 
prices fluctuate and often make decisions in-line with majority investors be-
cause they too fear the majority has seized important information.171 
Finally, like investing, sports gambling is not necessarily irrational be-
havior, but could instead be understood as a rational, high-risk investment.172  
When an individual on Wall Street wants a high pay-off with “sufficient in-
tensity,” the individual makes a high-risk investment.173  A sports wager is 
functionally the same as a high-risk investment in the stock market.174  The 
gambler knows that the venture is high-risk, but based on careful research 
and analysis, the gambler makes a high-risk, high pay-off investment on the 
selected team.  Furthermore, even assuming sports gambling contains irra-
tional behavior such as herd behavior and “thrill” seeking, these elements are 
also found in investing.175 
Therefore, sports wagers and investment contracts are very similar, and 
placing a sports wager is closely related to trading securities.  Because of 
their similarities, federal regulation of sports gambling should largely mirror 
 
167. Id.  
168. Id. at 611.  
169. Id.  
170. Id.  
171. Id.  
172. Hazen, supra note 128, at 409–10.  
173. Id.  
174. Id.  
175. See id.  
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the regulation of securities.  In particular, sports gambling regulations must 
criminally punish and enforce against fraud. 
3. Sports Gambling Regulations Should Strictly Punish and Broadly 
Enforce Against Fraud 
As Congress debates and revises SWMIA, they must ensure that the 
substance of sports gambling dictates how it is regulated.176  Social distaste 
and a misplaced focus on the parties are distractions that threaten the passage 
of effective, substantive-based regulations.177  Like securities, the core at-
tribute of any successful regulation is that it must work to prevent fraud.  
Fraud is the core evil of both securities and sports gambling.  The Securities 
Act was passed in large part “to insure the maintenance of fair and honest 
markets in transactions.”178  The Exchange Act similarly “provides remedies 
to investors or shareholders who have been misled or defrauded.”179  Like 
securities, sports gambling is susceptible to fraud.180  As explained below, 
Donaghy’s NBA scandal exemplifies how bookies and inside officials can 
destroy the integrity of sports.181  Successful sports gambling regulations will 
prevent fraud by strictly policing insider behavior and ensuring that profes-
sional leagues comply with enforcement agencies.   
Like securities, successful regulations should also establish a federal 
enforcement agency to enforce against fraud.  The Security Acts allows the 
Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) to directly bring claims against 
 
176. Id. at 377–78.  
177. Id. at 377.  
178. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2019); Chuff, supra note 117, at 620 (“The Securities Act was en-
acted to prevent investors from being defrauded in connection with the sale or purchase of securities 
in interstate commerce.”).  
179. Chuff, supra note 117, at 624; see § 78jjj (creating causes of action based on “fraud 
or deceit” and “misrepresentation.”).  
180. E.g. Eden supra note 1 (NBA referee placing bets on games he controlled); e.g., 
Gerard Couzens, The Shame in Spain Valencia Caught up in La Liga Match-Fixing Scandal With 
Win Over Real Valladolid That Secured Champions League Investigated, THE SUN (May 28, 2019), 
https://thesun.co.uk/sport/football/9168154/valencia-la-liga-match-fixing-real-valladolid/ 
[https://perma.cc/9GRT-SNRW] (La Liga players colluding with bookies to fix matches); e.g., 
Luke Harding, Two Years in Jail for Match-Fixing German Referee, GUARDIAN (Nov. 17, 2005),  
https://www.theguardian.com/football/2005/nov/18/newsstory.sport4 [https://perma.cc/XPV2-
X6R2] (German soccer referee colluding with bookies to fix matches).  
181. See Eden, supra note 1.  
ELLFELDT (DO NOT DELETE) 12/4/19  11:09 AM 
2019] BE HONEST WITH ME 113 
infringers.  The SEC may bring claims against corporations or individuals 
“if any of these entities defrauded an investor or shareholder.”182  The most 
common claims are securities fraud and insider trading.183  The SEC’s en-
forcement power is a key model for sports gambling.  Just like the SEC, 
enforcement of sports gambling needs a national federal agency to pool to-
gether resources and personnel to prevent sports gambling fraud on a na-
tional level.  The individual states cannot hope to individually combat the 
bookie and league-insider fraud that permeates state lines.184  Additionally, 
a direct enforcement power is important because like individual security 
holders, individual sports gamblers will rarely have the resources or incen-
tives to personally go after fraudulent operators.  Therefore, maintaining the 
integrity of sports gambling requires a national entity that can investigate and 
bring claims against fraudulent operators “through enforcement actions.”185 
SWMIA establishes a national entity, but the entity lacks power to en-
force against fraud.  Created by SWMIA, the National Sports Wagering 
Clearinghouse (“Clearinghouse”)186 is a national agency that collects and 
distributes data on legal and illegal sports gambling.187  With this pooled 
data, the Clearinghouse facilitates communication between federal and state 
enforcement agencies.188  The collection of information and facilitation of 
communication between entities is extremely important, but the Clearing-
house must go one step further.  To successfully regulate sports gambling, 
the Clearinghouse must also have the power to enforce the regulations 
against parties engaged in fraudulent behavior.  Armed with enforcement 
power, the Clearinghouse could streamline all its resources to efficiently 
combat fraudulent gambling in ways that individual consumers could not. 
Additionally, as with securities, sports gambling regulations must en-
force strict criminal penalties.  Strict criminal punishment is a cornerstone of 
 
182. See Chuff, supra note 117, at 624–25 (unlawful to defraud investors); see also § 78jjj 
(creating causes of action based on “fraud or deceit” or “misrepresentation”).  
183. Chuff, supra note 117, at 624–25.  
184. Cabot & Miller supra note 20, at 172.  
185. Chuff, supra note 117, at 625. 
186. Sports Wagering Market and Integrity Act, S. 3793, 115th Cong. § 106(a) (2018).  
187. Id. § 106(c)(4).  
188. Id.  
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corporate and securities regulations.  For example, when Congress passed 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), they “increased criminal penalties as an im-
portant part of its reforms.”189  Specifically, CEOs and CFOs of public com-
panies were then required to “personally certify their company’s financial 
statement with criminal consequences for false certifications.”190 
Federal sports gambling regulations should establish similar penalties.  
“The criminal enforcement weapon is especially applicable when we recog-
nize that many market participants are gamblers and many of the securities 
fraudsters seem to engage in behavior quite similar to those who profit from 
illegal gambling activities.”191  Because “fraudsters” in both securities and 
gambling behave similarly, criminal punishments are warranted in both.192  
Like public companies, gambling operators and sportsbooks that meet mini-
mum thresholds of revenue and/or number of consumers should be required 
to establish strict internal controls over their business operations.  As a na-
tional enforcement entity, the Clearinghouse should be restructured to en-
force criminal punishments against sportsbooks and operators that do not 
maintain and monitor sufficient internal controls.193  The exact scope of the 
internal controls that should be implemented is beyond this Article’s reach.  
However, at a minimum, the controls should require the leagues and opera-
tors to establish internal controls designed to prevent undue influence of 
games.194 
 
189. Hazen, supra note 128, at 384.  
190. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a) (2019).  
191. Hazen, supra note 128, at 384.  
192. Id.  
193. While SOX holds company officers personally liable in certain circumstances, that 
exact approach may not be conducive to sports gambling.  Holding sportsbook operators personally 
liable will inevitably create major barriers of entry.  The operators will likely have to purchase 
professional liability insurance and will inevitably pass this cost on to consumers.  If the prices rise 
too high, consumers may be driven back into cheap illegal markets.  See Purdum, supra note 20 
(expressing concern that 34% tax and $10 million licensing fee in Pennsylvania will drive consum-
ers to the cheaper illegal market); Congress should carefully consider whether holding the operators 
personally liable is worth the market costs.  Regardless, the regulations should require operators to 
establish and monitor internal controls that prevent operators from colluding with corrupt insiders 
who can influence the outcome of games, especially referees.  See Eden, supra note 1; see also 
Harding, supra note 180 (German soccer referee colluding with bookies to fix matches).  
194. E.g., N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:69n-17 (2019) (New Jersey regulations as example of 
regulatory internal controls).  
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Because sports wagers and securities are substantively similar, and be-
cause trading securities is similar to making sports wagers, sports gambling 
regulations should model securities regulations.  The regulations should ex-
pand the Clearinghouse from a simple information agency into an enforce-
ment agency that closely monitors sportsbooks and league officials.  The 
foregoing analysis heavily emphasizes the role of the federal government, 
but successful regulations also depend on participating state governments. 
B. Successful Regulations Will Strike an Appropriate Balance 
Between Federal and State Power 
The federal regulations outlined above are substantial.  They call for 
the federal government to play a significant role in the gambling market by 
greatly expanding a federal agency to monitor and enforce against fraud.  
Comprehensive federal regulations risk depriving the states of their interest 
in regulating their citizens.  Successful regulations, therefore, must strike a 
proper balance between federal and state control.  SWMIA adopts an appro-
priate balance between federal and state regulatory authority.  The Act allows 
states to create their own regulatory scheme so long as they opt in to the 
general federal scheme.195  This type of law is known as “cooperative feder-
alism.”196  A potential problem with this approach is that different states 
could regulate and report data differently.  The Clearinghouse, however, 
solves this problem by nationally collecting data and assisting enforcement 
agencies.197  SWMIA’s approach would solve this problem by maintaining 
state discretion while equipping the federal government to combat illegal 
gambling. 
1. States Should Retain Discretion to Issue Licenses 
An appropriate balance between federal and state power is crucial to 
successfully regulating sports gambling,198 and SWMIA achieves this proper 
balance.  SWMIA prohibits any operator from accepting sports wagers un-
less the state where the operator does business has opted in to SWMIA’s 
 
195. See Sports Wagering Market and Integrity Act, S. 3793, 115th Cong. §§ 101(a), (b) 
(2018).  
196. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 269 
(1981).  
197. S. 3793 § 106(a).  
198. Cabot & Miller, supra note 20, at 174.  
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regulatory scheme.199  Under this approach, the states must accept the general 
federal regulations, but the states retain authority to license the gambling op-
erators.200  The ability to issue licenses is a “central feature” of a state’s 
power over its citizens.201  “States’ discretion to grant licenses to and oversee 
the operations of casino owners and employees is a central feature of state 
regulatory regimes” and those “powers serve as the state’s primary means of 
control over the gaming industry.”202  States have many ways to license on a 
local level to meet local needs, including restricting hours of operation, pro-
hibiting sportsbooks from offering certain amenities, and broadly taxing 
gambling revenue.203  For example, West Virginia currently imposes a 10% 
tax on sports gambling while Pennsylvania imposes a 34% tax.204  Both pol-
icy choices represent distinct treatment of sports gambling in two different 
states and will have different effects on how sports gambling develops lo-
cally.  Additionally, many states have distinct economic goals in mind.  New 
Jersey, for example, structures its licensing requirements around revitalizing 
Atlantic City as an important economic hub.205  Furthermore, because indi-
vidual states are closer to the fraud that occurs within their borders, they can 
personalize their licensing to prevent local fraud.  By allowing states to issue 
licenses after opting in to the federal scheme, SWMIA suitably leaves the 
states discretion to license their own local operators.206 
 
199. S. 3793 §§ 101(a), (b).  
200. S. 3793 §§ 101(b), 103(b)(2)(C).  
201. Chuff, supra note 117, at 614.  
202. Id.  
203. Chuff, supra note 117, at 616 (2011) (an argument can be made that the federal regu-
lations infringe on state discretion by establishing consumer protections.  On a national level, 
SWMIA prevents persons under twenty-one, persons on the self-exclusion list, and interested 
coaches or players from placing sports wagers); S. 3793 §§ 101(a), (b) § 103(b)(4) (while states 
could maintain their own consumer protections more narrowly tailored to their respective interests, 
a uniform federal regulation efficiently establishes protections that most states would establish an-
yway).  
204. W. VA. CODE § 29-22D-16(a) (2019); 4 PA.C.S. § 13C62(a) (2019).  
205. Gregory, supra note 42, at 223–25; see Chuff, supra note 117, at 618–19 (regulations 
must mitigate the “systemic risk and pervasive externalities to affect the surrounding community 
and economy” while simultaneously realizing the benefits of “economic revitalization” and “enter-
tainment.”).  
206. Unlike PASPA, SWMIA does not violate the Tenth Amendment’s anticommandeer-
ing principle.  In Hodel, Congress enacted a law regulating coal mining and giving the states the 
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2. The Clearinghouse Vitally Facilitates Communication Between 
the States, Federal Government, and the Leagues 
To equip the states and leagues to protect the integrity of sports, 
SWMIA establishes the Clearinghouse as a national entity to collect and or-
ganize sports data.207  The Clearinghouse operates a national repository of 
data accessible by enforcement officers.208  This interstate repository is im-
portant because states do not have the resources to fight illegal gambling on 
their own.209  The illegal market is widespread, and much illegal gambling is 
housed overseas.210  States need a national entity to readily collect and dis-
tribute data.211  Without national collection, states would be forced to con-
stantly communicate with one another about information that has been col-
lected in different ways, or not collected at all.212  This state-by-state 
approach is especially inefficient when Internet gambling occurs across state 
and national lines.  Most importantly, to prevent fraud by corrupt officials, 
the sports leagues also need a national entity to collect and distribute data.  
The sports leagues operate across state lines, and a national entity provides 
a centralized information resource for the leagues.  Without a centralized 
resource, the leagues would be relying on individual states to collect and 
distribute information.  Even if the states decided to collect and offer data to 
the leagues, the leagues would have to synthesize and make sense of accu-
mulated data.  A state-by-state method is therefore inefficient and risks that 
some states will not participate.  The Clearinghouse, on the other hand, is 
efficient.  It ensures that data and information will be captured and offered 
 
choice to “either implement” the federal program “or else yield to a federally administered regula-
tory program.”  Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 289 (1981).  
Thus, the states were “not compelled to enforce the [federal] standards” or to “participate in the 
federal regulatory program.” Id. at 288.  The Court deemed this kind of law as “cooperative feder-
alism” and held that it did not violate the anticommandeering principle because it did not compel 
states to participate.  Id. at 289; see Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1479 (2018) (“[T]he federal 
law allowed but did not require the States to implement a federal program.”) (emphasis in original).  
207. S. 3793 § 106(a).  
208. Id. § 106(c)(4).  
209. Cabot & Miller, supra note 20, at 172.  
210. Id.  
211. Id.  
212. Id. at 176.  
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to the leagues on a national level, consistent with their national business 
model. 
England’s gambling laws provide an example of a successful national 
information entity.  In 2004, England proposed a Bill that reinvented the 
country’s regulation of sports gambling.213  The Bill granted the Gambling 
Commission power to facilitate information with local agencies.214  The 
Commission’s power includes: 
[I]nvestigatory powers previously unavailable to the Gaming 
Board that include requiring local authority to produce 
information, and enabling it to exchange information (including 
criminal records) through ‘gateways’ with sporting and other 
industry regulators and enforcement agencies.215 
Like England’s Commission, the Clearinghouse can “exchange infor-
mation” and require “local authority to produce information.”216  These pow-
ers over local authorities will enable the Clearinghouse to closely monitor 
sports gambling fraud on a national level.217  The in-flow of local information 
into a national collecting agency is crucial to efficiently monitor illegal prac-
tices.218  Like England’s Commission, the Clearinghouse will properly equip 
the federal government, state governments, and the leagues to combat illegal 
gambling.  The Clearinghouse and the provision allowing states to license 
local operators establishes a balanced federal-state approach that will con-
tribute to SWMIA’s success.  While the federal-state balance is appropriate, 
SWMIA still must work hard to prevent insider fraud. 
 
213. See generally Gambling Act 2005, c.19, § 326(1), (Eng.); Stephen Walsh & Juan 
Lopez, Gambling on a New Commission, 154 NLJ 1850 (2004).  
214. Walsh & Lopez, supra note 213. 
215. Id.  
216. Id.  
217. Id.  
218. Returning briefly to the securities analogy, Christopher Chuff has argued that a “sin-
gle, unified administrative agency should govern all participants and transactions in the financial 
markets.”  Chuff, supra note 117, at 614 (citations omitted).  Such a single agency would “enable 
open communication between many financial regulators, increase efficiency of the administrative 
agencies’ aggregate actions, and breed consistency and predictability into the legal framework.”  
Id. at 614 (citations omitted).  These same principles hold true for the Clearinghouse in the sports 
gambling market.  
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C. Successful Regulations Must Encourage and Require 
Cooperation Between the Leagues and Enforcement Agencies 
Finally, federal regulations should both encourage and require the 
leagues to cooperate with enforcement agencies.  To protect the integrity of 
professional sports, the regulations must prevent fraudulent match fixing.  
The best way to prevent fraudulent match fixing is to ensure that the leagues 
will help combat the fraud.  To ensure the leagues will help, the regulations 
should both encourage and require the leagues to cooperate with enforcement 
agencies.  Otherwise, scandals like Donaghy’s will persist. 
1. The Largest Threat to Sports Integrity Comes from the Inside 
Federal regulations can help prevent fraud, but match-fixing could not 
be stopped overnight since the government regulates sports gambling.219  The 
“global nature” of match-fixing in soccer, for example, demonstrates that 
match-fixing can “take place anywhere, regardless of whether gambling on 
sports is legal or illegal in a particular place.”220  When considering the scope 
of the regulations, Congress must recognize that match-fixing boils down to 
corrupt insiders, specifically players or referees.221  The largest threat to the 
integrity of sports comes from fraud generated by players or referees and 
corrupt bookies.222  Within the last fifteen years, there have been three inci-
dents which illustrate how this fraud occurs. 
First, in Germany, Robert Hoyzer refereed games in the nation’s top 
soccer league (“Bundesliga”).223  German enforcement agencies accused 
Hoyzer of fraudulently fixing matches.224  After a four-week trial, the court 
found Hoyzer guilty of fixing matches by awarding penalties to sides that he 
bet on and sending off players for sides that he bet against.225  Hoyzer report-
edly conspired with a sports-bar owner to fix the matches, and even received 
 
219. Gregory, supra note 42, at 219.  
220. Id. 
221. E.g. Eden, supra note 1; e.g., Couzens, supra note 180; e.g., Harding, supra note 180.  
222. E.g. Eden, supra note 1; e.g., Couzens, supra note 180; e.g., Harding, supra note 180.  
223. Harding, supra note 180.  
224. Id.  
225. Id.  
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solicitations from sports bettors during halftime of some matches.226  Less 
than five years later, German police uncovered possible violations in three 
Union of European Football Association (UEFA) Champions League 
matches and twelve UEFA Europa League matches.227  The German police 
noted that more than 200 games were under suspicion, but informed the pub-
lic that this might be just the “tip of the iceberg.”228  The police believed that 
more than one referee was involved, and catching all of the perpetrators was 
crucial to maintaining integrity.229 
Second, a scandal recently occurred in Spain’s top soccer league, La 
Liga.230  On the last day of the season, fifth-placed Valencia faced Real Val-
ladolid.231  Valencia needed a win to secure an automatic spot in next year’s 
Champions League, a coveted position for clubs across Europe.232  A betting 
agency reportedly paid Valladolid players to fix the match, and Valencia won 
the game after Valladolid made two atrocious defensive mistakes.233  Span-
ish reports indicate that a criminal organizational leader named “Bravo” fa-
cilitated the fraud.234  While the suspected players have been arrested, the 
investigation to uncover the extent of the scandal is ongoing.235 
 
226. Id.  
227. Owen Gibson, Europe Hit by ‘Biggest-Ever’ Match-Fixing Scandal, GUARDIAN (Nov. 
20, 2009), https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2009/nov/20/uefa-match-fixing-germany 
[https://perma.cc/JHE8-2XF7]. 
228. Id.  
229. Compared to the professional athletes or coaches, professional referees are especially 
susceptible to betting syndicates because they often make significantly less money.  See Jack An-
derson, Sports: Murphy’s Law, 161 NAT’L L.J. 395 (2011) (“A common theme has been that indi-
viduals targeted by betting syndicates are often those who, relative to their counterparts, are mod-
estly paid.”).  
230. Couzens, supra note 180.  
231. Id.  
232. Id.  
233. Id.  
234. Id.  
235. Id.  
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Finally, the Donaghy scandal is a sobering example of insider fraud.236  
Donaghy refereed NBA games from 1994 to 2007.237  According to his wife, 
he was extremely secretive and spent most of his time playing golf and gam-
bling.238  Sometime in the early 2000s, Donaghy allegedly began placing 
wagers on games that he officiated.239  According to ESPN, but denied by 
the NBA, Donaghy colluded with well-connected bookies to fix NBA games 
by ensuring that the game stayed in the spread.240  ESPN writer Scott Eden 
claims that Donaghy kept games in the spread by calling more fouls or letting 
fouls slide depending on how the game developed.241  While the NBA claims 
that Donaghy’s bets were isolated incidents, Eden claims that Donaghy 
placed wagers on games that he officiated for many years.242  Like Robert 
Hoyzer and the La Liga soccer players, Donaghy used his close position to 
fraudulently affect the outcome of a game.  Corrupt insiders with power to 
alter the outcome of any given match are the primary source of sports gam-
bling fraud, and the regulations must focus on these individuals. 
2. The Regulations Must Encourage the Leagues to Cooperate, and 
SWMIA’s Exclusive Data Provision Will Help Accomplish This 
Goal 
To prevent the fraud outlined above, the leagues must be fully commit-
ted to preventing fraud.  The regulations, therefore, should encourage the 
leagues to cooperate with enforcement agencies.  To foster cooperation 
through the regulations, Congress has various options.  Paying the leagues a 
flat integrity fee under the regulatory scheme is one way to get the leagues 
 
236. Eden, supra note 1.  
237. Id.  
238. Id.  
239. In his article, Eden believes the evidence is clear that Donaghy placed wagers on 
games that he personally refereed. Eden, supra note 1 (the NBA disputes that Donaghy placed bets 
on games that he actually refereed); see Cassandra Negley, NBA Disputes Findings, Game Anec-
dotes and ‘Conflicting’ Quotes in ESPN’s Tim Donaghy Report, YAHOO! SPORTS (Feb. 22, 2019, 
11:38 AM), https://sports.yahoo.com/nba-disputes-findings-game-anecdotes-conflicting-quotes-
espns-tim-donaghy-report-193821436.html [https://perma.cc/3KNP-MAW7]. 
240. Eden, supra note 1; Negley, supra note 239.  
241. Eden, supra note 1.  
242. Eden, supra note 1; Negley, supra note 239. 
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on board.243  Another method is to include a provision that pays the leagues 
for use of their data and information.244  The NBA specifically believes it 
should receive compensation for the use of its data.245  Commissioner Adam 
Silver claims that without the NBA as an organization, the data would not be 
available and sports gambling would not be possible.246  While existing law 
does not create protectable interests in sports data, SWMIA effectively fash-
ions an exception for the leagues.247  This exception is not perfect, but it 
adequately fosters cooperation between the leagues and the government. 
To foster cooperation, the regulations could pay the leagues for use of 
their data, but existing law does not support any protectable interest in the 
data.  Courts have recognized unfair competition between businesses built 
on disseminating facts, but the facts themselves are not protectable prop-
erty.248  A foundational case addressing the protection of facts is Int’l News 
Serv. v. AP, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) (“INS”).  Both the plaintiff and defendant 
published news, but the defendant poached facts from plaintiff’s sources and 
sold the facts as news to plaintiff’s competitors.249  The Court noted that the 
commercial value of the news lay in the promptness and accuracy of the in-
formation.250  Under unfair competition laws, defendant could not rip off 
plaintiff’s hard-earned efforts to gather and organize the facts.251  Otherwise, 
 
243. See Adam Candee, NBA’s Adam Silver on Sports Betting, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (June 
1, 2018), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/20904/nba-commissioner-adam-silver-talks-sports-
betting/ [https://perma.cc/E9MC-86UX] [hereinafter NBA’s Sports Betting].  
244. See Matt Rybaltowski, Adam Silver Touts Virtues of NBA’s Intellectual Property In 




245. NBA’s Sports Betting, supra note 243.  
246. Id.  
247. Sports Wagering Market Integrity Act, S. 3793, 115th Cong. § 103(b)(5) (2018).  
248. See Int’l News Serv. v. Assoc. Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234 (1918); see also Nat’l Football 
League v. Governor of Del., 435 F. Supp. 1372, 1377 (D. Del. 1977); see also Nat’l Basketball 
Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 847 (2d Cir. 1997).  
249. Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 231.  
250. Id. at 230.  
251. Id. at 239.  
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defendant could “reap where it has not sown.”252  The Court upheld the in-
junction against defendant for appropriating and disseminating plaintiff’s 
news.253  But the Court limited its ruling to unfair competition between the 
parties and declined to hold that the parties had public rights to the infor-
mation.254  Furthermore, the Court expressly held that the facts themselves 
were in the public domain and could not be protected by copyright.255 
Subsequent courts limited the scope of unfair competition under INS 
while emphasizing that facts and data could not be protected.256  The issue 
arose in a sports and gambling context in the mid-1970s.257  Delaware 
established a lottery system in which consumers placed small bets on the 
outcome of NFL games.258  The lottery scoreboard did not use any team 
names, but it referred to the teams by city, such as “Philadelphia” when 
referring to the Philadelphia Eagles.259  The NFL sued the state of Delaware 
for misappropriation and trademark infringement in Nat’l Football League 
v. Governor of Del. (“Delaware”).260  In that case, the NFL argued that they 
had invested immense time and effort in building the popularity of their 
brand.261  According to the NFL, by profiting from information generated by 
NFL games, Delaware “reap[ed] where it ha[d] not sown.”262 
 
252. Id.  
253. Id. at 246.  
254. Id. at 236.  
255. Id. at 234.  
256. See Nat’l Football League v. Governor of Del., 435 F. Supp. 1372, 1377 (D. Del. 
1977); see also Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 847 (2d Cir. 1997); see also 
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).  
257. Nat’l Football League, 435 F. Supp. at 1375.  
258. Id.  
259. Id. at 1380.  
260. Id. at 1375–76.  
261. Id. at 1377.  
262. Id. (quoting Int’l News Serv. v. Assoc. Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239 (1918)).  
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However, the court rejected the NFL’s argument.263  It found that the 
NFL did not have a protectable interest in the “end result” of its hard labor, 
regardless of how much “public interest” the information generated.264  Fur-
ther, the NFL disseminated the information into the public domain, and it did 
not have a protectable interest in public information.265  The judge compared 
lotteries that profit from sports data to businesses that profit from sports 
games by selling food or souvenirs to game attendants on their way to the 
stadium.266  According to the court, businesses that profit from sports games 
in this way are “collateral service[s]” to the game itself.267  Like the adjacent 
businesses that profit from game attendants, gambling operators may profit 
from public sports information.268  Therefore, the NFL had no protectable 
stake in public game data and they could not collect any profits from gam-
bling operators who used the information.269 
In a similar vein, the Second Circuit declined to extend copyright 
protection to athletic competitions and the data underlying the games.270  In 
1996, Motorola manufactured the “SportsTrax” device.271  SportsTrax 
supplied real-time information about NBA games, including the teams 
playing, scores, time remaining, and possession.272  SportsTrax operated on 
a “data feed” in which live watchers or listeners streamed the information as 
they watched the game.273  The NBA claimed that this relay of information 
 
263. Id. at 1377–78.  
264. Id. at 1377.  
265. Id.  
266. Id. at 1378.  
267. Id.  
268. Id.  
269. Id.  
270. See generally Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997).  
271. Id. at 843.  
272. Id. at 843–44.  
273. Id. at 844.  
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violated its copyright in the games.274  However, the court held that the sports 
game itself is not sufficiently “authored” for copyright protection.275  The 
court noted that a broadcast can be copyrighted when it is simultaneously 
recorded by the NBA.276  However, the court specifically held that the data 
from the broadcasts, including game scores and other statistics, could not be 
protected by copyright.277  Because the facts are not protectable, private 
entities like sports gambling operators may freely use the game data.278 
The court also distinguished Int’l News Serv. v. Assoc. Press from the 
case because Motorola’s real-time transmission did not “free-ride” on the 
NBA’s efforts.279  The court distinguished between appropriating infor-
mation from the NBA’s source and using one’s own resources and efforts to 
collect facts from the game.280  Because Motorola used its own efforts to 
collect factual game information, and because there is no inherent property 
right in that information, it did not unfairly compete under INS.281 
INS, Delaware, and Motorola collectively illustrate that under current 
law, the sports leagues are not legally entitled to compensation for use of 
their data.282  The data from games are not protectable by copyright or trade-
mark, no matter how much effort and money the leagues invest in each 
game.283  Under these cases, sports gambling is a “collateral” business to the 
 
274. Id. at 845.  
275. Id. at 847.  
276. Id.  
277. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006); see also Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 
499 U.S. 340 (1991); Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 105 F.3d at 847.  
278. Nat’l Football League v. Governor of Del., 435 F. Supp. 1372, 1379 (D. Del. 1977) 
(noting that gambling operators are free to use public sports information).  
279. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 105 F.3d at 854 (citation omitted).  
280. Id.  
281. Id.  
282. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006); Int’l News Serv. v. Assoc. Press, 248 U.S. 215, 223 
(1918); Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 105 F.3d at 847.  
283. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a); Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 234; Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 105 
F.3d at 847.  
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sports games themselves.284  Therefore, while Congress could compensate 
the leagues for use of their data, this method has no direct support from case 
law.285  Unless federal regulations create an exception to the rules above, the 
leagues are not entitled to compensation for the use of their data.  Without 
compensation, however, the leagues will lack incentive to cooperate with the 
government’s cumbersome regulations.  To solve this problem and foster 
cooperation, SWMIA compensates the leagues by granting them exclusive 
control over gambling data.286 
Instead of compensating the leagues for their data or paying the leagues 
a flat fee for maintaining integrity, SWMIA contains an exclusive data pro-
vision.287  The provision provides that until 2024, all licensed gambling op-
erators may only use data provided by the relevant sports league or an entity 
expressly authorized by that league.288  After 2024, the operators must use 
data of the same quality approved by the applicable league.289  For example, 
a sportsbook accepting wagers for a Sunday NFL football game may only 
use data authorized by the NFL.  In anticipation of this provision, the leagues 
have already established business relationships with sports data proces-
sors.290  All four leagues process data using Sportradar, a leading sports data 
 
284. Nat’l Football League v. Governor of Del., 435 F. Supp. 1372, 1378 (D. Del. 1977).  
285. Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 23; Nat’l Football League, 435 F. Supp. at 1377–78; 
Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 105 F.3d at 847.  
286. Sports Wagering Market Integrity Act, S. 3793, 115th Cong. § 103(b)(5) (2018).  
287. Id.  
288. Id.  
289. Id.  
290. League Partnerships, SPORTRADAR, https://sportradar.us/about-us/league-partner-
ships/ [https://perma.cc/K736-JW8T] (outlining Sportradar’s relationship with the NFL, NBA, 
MLB, and NHL). 
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collector and processer.291  Sportradar uses an application programing inter-
face (API) to collect and process sports data.292  Sportradar’s API and Man-
aged Trading Services (MTS) can help users create custom sportsbook plat-
forms, making an easy jump into the gambling market for the leagues.293  In 
fact, the NBA has already incorporated Sportradar’s integrity processes and 
policies, setting the stage for a smooth transition if and when SWMIA takes 
effect.294  Big-business data operators like Sportradar are likely the type of 
entities that will exclusively provide data to operators under SWMIA.295 
SWMIA’s exclusive data provision vests immense power in the sports 
leagues, but ultimately is an appropriate way to foster cooperation between 
the leagues and the government.  In sports gambling, control over data dic-
tates the entire industry.296  Whoever controls the data effectively controls 
sports gambling.297  Control over data distribution is essentially “the differ-
ence between having value and having no value at all.”298  Congress, there-
fore, has given the leagues an extremely valuable method of control over 
sports gambling.  Because the leagues have exclusive protection of the data 
under SWMIA, the bill effectively carves out an exception to the Delaware 
 
291. Id. (outlining Sportradar’s relationship with the NFL, NBA, MLB, and NHL); 
Rybaltowski, supra note 244.  
292. Sports Data, SPORTRADAR, https://sportradar.us/sports-data/ 
[https://perma.cc/QX5K-X9B8].  
293. Sports Betting, SPORTRADAR, https://sportradar.us/betting-services/ 
[https://perma.cc/FXZ9-KDQP] (“Whether you want to create a sophisticated sportsbook from 
scratch, or expand and grow an existing one, Sportradar’s Managed Trading Services (MTS) is the 
perfect partner.”).  
294. Rybaltowski, supra note 244.  
295. League Partnerships, supra note 290 (outlining Sportradar’s relationship with the 
NFL, NBA, MLB, and NHL).  
296. See James Glanz & Agustin Armendariz, When Sports Betting is Legal, the Value of 
Game Data Soars, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/02/sports/sports-
betting.html [https://perma.cc/T249-MQ7P].  
297. Id. 
298. Id.  
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and Motorola rules.299  In the context of sports gambling, the leagues now 
have a protectable interest in the facts derived from the applicable game. 
Furthermore, while the exclusive data provision expires in 2024, this 
limitation is less restrictive than it appears.  As of the current SWMIA draft, 
the data provision expires in 2024.300  Future drafts, however, could extend 
the date or make it permanent.301  Indeed, under the first draft, the provision 
expired in 2022 but has since been pushed back to 2024.302  Additionally, 
after 2024, the data must be of the same quality as that approved by the 
leagues.303  The leagues already use high-quality data provided by providers 
like Sportradar.304  Under a narrow interpretation, “of the same quality” may 
be limited to data from providers like Sportradar who are closely affiliated 
with the leagues.305  A narrow interpretation would effectively keep the data 
in the leagues’ control.  Other criticisms of the data provision include market 
barriers and other inefficiencies.306  For example, data from leading provid-
ers like Sportradar and Genius Sports is expensive.307  The going rate for a 
data package covering 300 games can fall within $4,000 to $6,000 a 
month.308  Small operators cannot afford these prices, and this provision will 
 
299. See Nat’l Football League v. Governor of Del., 435 F. Supp. 1372, 1378 (D. Del. 
1977); see also Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 847 (2d Cir. 1997).  
300. Sports Wagering Market Integrity Act, S. 3793, 115th Cong. § 103(b)(5) (2018).  
301. See John Brennan, Federal Sports Betting Bill Has ‘Integrity’ in the Title and Data in 
the Details, SPORTS HANDLE (Dec. 19, 2018), https://sportshandle.com/federal-sports-betting-bill-
introduced/ [https://perma.cc/7H4G-HEW3] (pointing out that the timeline has already been ex-
tended from 2022 to 2024).  
302. Id.  
303. S. 3793 § 103(b)(5).  
304. Sports Betting, supra note 293.  
305. S. 3793 § 103(b)(5).  
306. See Matt Rybaltowski, Here’s How Much ‘Official’ League Data Actually Costs, 
SPORTS HANDLE (Mar. 12, 2019), https://sportshandle.com/sports-betting-official-data-cost/ 
[https://perma.cc/FLL2-YKUE] [hereinafter Official League Data Cost] (indicating that small op-
erators cannot pay for big-company data and big company data may not be of much higher quality 
anyway).  
307. Id.  
308. Id.  
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create even higher barriers of entry to the gambling market.309  Some experts 
also argue that as technology becomes generally available to smaller opera-
tors, there is no substantial difference in quality in data from league-author-
ized entities and non-authorized entities.310  Finally, SWMIA’s data provi-
sion may create virtual monopolies in large data companies that have close 
connections to the powerful sports leagues.311 
Although the data provision has troubling implications, it ultimately 
will encourage the cooperation necessary to combat fraud.  For the reasons 
above, the exclusive data provision vests substantial power in the leagues 
and it might hinder the growth of the gambling market.  While this power 
should not be granted lightly, the data provision is the kind of compensation 
that will facilitate cooperation between the leagues and the government.  
Without their slice of the pie, the leagues will have less incentive to comply 
with cumbersome federal regulations.  Thus, the data provision should give 
the leagues incentive to cooperate.  But merely encouraging cooperation may 
not be enough to keep the leagues accountable.  In addition to being encour-
aged to cooperate, the leagues should be required to cooperate with enforce-
ment agencies. 
3.  The Regulations Must Require the Leagues to Cooperate, but 
SWMIA Does Not Expressly Require the Leagues to Cooperate 
While SWMIA’s data provision encourages the leagues to cooperate, 
SWMIA troublingly leaves room for the leagues to cover up internal fraud.312  
Under the Bill, gambling operators and state entities must explicitly cooper-
ate with federal investigations.313  However, the Bill fails to require the sports 
 
309. See Cabot & Miller, supra note 20, at 158–59 (discussing barriers to entry created by 
regulatory compliance costs).  
310. Official League Data Cost, supra note 306; see also Glanz & Armendariz, supra note 
296 (arguing that Sportsradar’s affiliation with oft-indicted offshore operators presents yet another 
integrity issue).  
311. In the case of Sportradar, the integrity of the data provider also becomes an issue.  
According to various reports, Sportradar has provided information to offshore operators that are 
under federal investigation.  See Glanz & Armendariz, supra note 296.  
312. See Sports Wagering Market Integrity Act, S. 3793, 115th Cong. § 103(b)(15) (2018).  
313. Id.  
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leagues to cooperate with investigations.314  Donaghy’s referee scandal illus-
trates how and why the leagues may abuse this freedom to undermine the 
investigation and enforcement of fraud. 
Donaghy’s scandal suggests that the leagues may undercut enforce-
ment agencies to preserve their brand.  After the FBI received a tip that 
Donaghy was fixing spreads, it conducted a tight-lipped investigation.315  
The FBI held the investigation under wraps because it wanted to catch other 
colluding referees.316  Despite this covert approach, the lead investigator sat 
down to discuss the scandal with then-NBA Commissioner David Stern and 
other NBA executives, including current commissioner Adam Silver.317  
Stern was visibly upset, and he voiced complete cooperation with the FBI.318  
Only a month after the meeting, however, the investigation leaked to the New 
York Post, which naturally blew the entire issue open.319  The author of 
ESPN’s article suggests, and the FBI’s lead investigator believes, that the 
NBA leaked the story to avoid uncovering widespread game fixtures by other 
referees.320  By allegedly leaking the story, the NBA purportedly cut off any 
chance of exposing pervasive integrity violations within the league.321 
Naturally, the NBA disputes the accuracy of ESPN’s article, including 
the extent of Donaghy’s collusion.322  Regardless of whether the NBA leaked 
the investigation, this scandal illustrates the potential conflict between 
leagues and enforcement agencies.  Professional sports leagues have power-
ful brands.323  Like all brands, their value is subject to public perception.  The 
 
314. See id.  
315. Eden, supra note 1.  
316. Id.  
317. Id.  
318. Id.  
319. Id.  
320. Id.  
321. Id.; Gibson, supra note 227.  
322. See Negley, supra note 239.  
323. See Kenneth Cortsen, NBA, LeBron James and Global Branding of Basketball, SPORT 
MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVES (July 6, 2017), http://kennethcortsen.com/nba-lebron-james-global-
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leagues will maintain the appearance of integrity at all costs, and they have 
powerful resources to do so.324  If they are not required to cooperate with the 
regulating or enforcement agencies, they can use their power to inhibit in-
vestigations that might devastate their business.325  Therefore, unless the reg-
ulations strictly regulate the leagues, internal violations will persist. 
To solve this problem, the regulations should first facially require the 
leagues to cooperate.  Congress can find helpful language in the United 
Kingdom Gambling Commission publications.326  The United Kingdom 
passed comprehensive gambling regulations in 2005.327  The regulations 
state that “[a] person commits an offence if without reasonable excuse he 
obstructs, or fails to cooperate with, a constable, enforcement officer or au-
thorized person who is exercising or seeking to exercise a power” under the 
Act.328  Because sports gambling is widespread in the United Kingdom, law-
makers in the United States should openly derive from the language and ap-
proach of the United Kingdom Commission.  At a bare minimum, federal 
regulations must include similar language requiring the leagues to cooperate 
with—and not obstruct—investigations. 
Additionally, as a lead enforcement and information agency, the Clear-
inghouse should promulgate codes that clarify the role of league officials.   
 
 
branding-basketball/ [https://perma.cc/67YU-AC8J] (“[T]he business model of the NBA and the 
attached capitalization power have grown considerably over the years.”).  
324. For example, at the time that Eden suggests the NBA leaked the Donaghy scandal, 
former FBI agent Bernie Tolbert served as Senior Vice President of Security for the NBA.  Eden, 
supra note 1.  
325. E.g., id.  
326. See generally Gambling Act 2005, c.19, § 326(1), (Eng.).  
327. Id.  
328. Id.  Under the United Kingdom’s standard scale, the maximum fine available for this 
offense is £1,000.  See Gambling Act 2005, c.19, § 326(2), (Eng.); see also Criminal Justice Act 
1982, c.48, § 37(2), (Eng.).  
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The United Kingdom’s Gambling Commission provides several provisions 
with helpful language.329  For example, the United Kingdom’s Gambling 
Commission requires licensees to: 
[W]ork with the Commission in an open and cooperative way and 
to disclose anything which the Commission would reasonably 
need to be aware of in exercising its regulatory functions.  This 
includes, in particular, anything that is likely to have a material 
impact on the licensee’s business or on the licensee’s ability to 
conduct licensed activities compliantly.  Licensees should have 
this principle in mind in their approach to, and when considering 
their compliance with, their obligations under the conditions 
attached to their license.330 
By including simple language like this, the Clearinghouse could ac-
tively remind and encourage league officials to cooperate with the regula-
tions.  Because the Clearinghouse will work closely with the leagues in the 
course of exchanging data and information,331 the entities have an oppor-
tunity to build a strong relationship.  If the relationship is strong and mutually 
respectful, league officials are more likely to cooperate. 
Facial requirements and good relationships, however, may not be 
enough.  Eden suggests that the NBA, who did not have a bad relationship 
with the FBI and expressed total cooperation with the investigation, leaked 
the scandal to prematurely end the investigation.332  The regulations must, 
therefore, enforce criminal punishments against league officials who refuse 
to cooperate or obstruct enforcement agencies.333  To enforce criminal pun-
ishments, the Clearinghouse should exercise strong oversight over the 
 
329. Gambling Codes of Practice, U.K. GAMBLING COMMISSION (Apr. 2018), 
https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/PDF/Gambling-codes-of-practice-Consolidated-for-all-
forms-of-gambling.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9SS-HFXE].  
330. Id.  
331. See Sports Wagering Market and Integrity Act, S. 3793, 115th Cong. § 106(a) (2018).  
332. Eden, supra note 1.  
333. See Hazen, supra note 128, at 384 (“The criminal enforcement weapon is especially 
applicable when we recognize that many market participants are gamblers and many of the securi-
ties fraudsters seem to engage in behavior quite similar to those who profit from illegal gambling 
activities.”).  
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leagues.334  Like the SEC, the Clearinghouse should perform routine check-
ups and streamline investigations of league officials.335  Because it facilitates 
data and information between leagues and enforcement agencies, the Clear-
inghouse is already in prime position to strictly monitor the leagues during 
investigations.336  With increased oversight and threat of stricter punishment, 
the professional leagues will have more difficulty undermining investiga-
tions. 
Congress must walk a fine line.  The drafters must encourage coopera-
tion without twisting the leagues’ arms.  Forced cooperation may embitter 
the leagues, making them more likely to undermine operations.  Too little 
encouragement, on the other hand, permits the leagues to protect their brand 
at the expense of integrity.  There is no easy answer, but successful regula-
tions must at least facially require the leagues to cooperate. Successful reg-
ulations will also require strict compliance with enforcement agencies and 
criminally punish obstructionists.  Unless SWMIA is revised to require this 
cooperation and enforce criminal punishments for violators, internal viola-
tions like Donaghy’s (and the other NBA referees who may have partook in 
the scandal)337 will go unrevealed and unpunished. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
A new dawn is rising for sports gambling in the United States, and it 
presents significant legal challenges.  In Murphy, the Court tossed away wide 
prohibition on sports gambling,338 and the federal government must decide 
how to regulate this lucrative market.339  To prevent fraud, federal regula-
tions must primarily emulate security regulations.  Like security regulations, 
the regulations cannot work properly unless they prevent fraud through crim-
inal punishment and strict enforcement.  Additionally, successful regulations 
 
334. As explained above, the Clearinghouse under the current draft of SWMIA plays only 
an informational role.  See S. 3793 § 106(a).  The Clearinghouse, however, should take on an en-
forcement and monitoring role, especially with the professional sport leagues.  
335. See Chuff, supra note 117, at 624–25 (citations omitted) (discussing the SEC’s en-
forcement role).  
336. See S. 3793 § 106(a).  
337. See Eden, supra note 1.  
338. Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1481 (2018).  
339. See generally S. 3793.  
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must strike a proper balance between state and federal control.  The crucial 
part of this balance is allowing the states to license operators while establish-
ing a national entity to collect and distribute data.  Finally, the regulations 
must decide how to encourage cooperation between the government and the 
professional sport leagues.  While the leagues are not entitled to compensa-
tion for the use of game data,340 SWMIA encourages cooperation by granting 
control of the data exclusively to the leagues.341  While the leagues may be 
encouraged, they must also be required to cooperate.  The Clearinghouse 
must take an active oversight role and enforce criminal punishments against 
the leagues for failure to cooperate.  There is no clear play in this area, but 
successful regulations must cover these fundamental requirements. 
 
 
340. Int’l News Serv. v Assoc. Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234 (1918); Nat’l Football League v. 
Governor of Del., 435 F. Supp. 1372, 1377–78 (D. Del. 1977); Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, 
Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 847 (2d Cir. 1997).  
341. See S. 3793 § 103(b)(5). 
